Cops Use Counterinsurgency Tactics Against Americans

Springfield, MA cops arrest an "insurgent"—formerly called a "suspect" before the benefits of the Terror War came home to roost in the USA.
As this New York Times story makes clear, the enormous investment in treasure and training, to make sure that American troops can fight any insurgency to a bloody, pointless standstill, is paying great dividends back home.

Using these same counterinsurgency tactics against American citizens, ones alleged to be associated with criminal gangs, police officers (and Iraq War veterans) in Springfield, Massachusetts, realized the Puerto Rican neighborhoods in their town had "troubling parallels" to "Avghani, the small northern Iraqi town where the two had helped establish and train a local police force to combat insurgents."

Instead of asking whether these two Captain Americas had maybe brought too much of the war home with them—were they going to call in airstrikes on the "enemy" next?—the police officials in Springfield decided to give counterinsurgency a try. After all, they weren't going to be bothering regular, white, people with it.

Just "a low-income, largely Puerto Rican neighborhood in the North End".

The Times notes that things had allegedly gotten so bad there, that "[g]unfire erupted almost daily" from gang member carrying "semiautomatic rifles in broad daylight."

Wow, of course, people carrying (and even shooting) semiautomatic rifles in broad daylight is something you run into a lot in the USA. If they're regular, white, people, you call them NRA members, and people like Ted Nugent are all for protecting their rights. If they're Puerto Rican (AMERICANS), or Mexican (AMERICANS), or black AMERICANS, you call them "gang members" or now—"insurgents".

The Times tells us that part of the counterinsurgency methods that worked so well in Iraq and Afghanistan—"gaining the trust and support of those most affected" by the war—would work well in disrupting and degrading the support the targeted community allegedly afforded to whatever criminal activity the police asserted needed to be treated in a military manner.

While buried deep in the Times story, the acknowledgment is made that the counterinsurgency program's "success has not yet been validated with hard numbers", one sign things were getting better in the targeted neighborhoods is "Graffiti was...greatly reduced." Similar claims of great success are regularly touted by the US military as well for counterinsurgency methods whose very premise is absolutely bizarre—that people courageously fighting an invading army (of Americans) are somehow at fault for doing so.

We should not imagine for a moment that the great, brutal, benefits of having created a massive pool of experts at being killers, destroyers, and blithe buriers of collateral debris, will not be visited upon the USA.

These Terror War vets, and the world view they will inflict upon all Americans, will likely make the Vietnam vets (and their issues) look like a placid tea party.